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Systemic Cyber Risks and Defense: 
Valuation, Innovation and Strategic 
Implications1 
Pythagoras N. Petratos2 
The Economic Undertheorizing of Systemic Cyber Risks 
A broad consensus exists among experts that cyberattacks are increasing both in number, 
variety, and sophistication. Some cyberattacks such as phishing and attacks on critical 
infrastructures are aimed at the whole of society and whole states, while others target specific parts 
of cyberspace, such as companies and military facilities. The internet has produced vast wealth 
and distributed knowledge in a globally free, open and borderless space.  However, the economic 
benefits of cyberspace are continuously threatened by the rise of large scale, catastrophic, systemic 
cyber events. Such adverse cyber events could cause enormous disruptions to numerous systems 
all over cyberspace. Some of these systems might not be able to recover.  
Systemic cyber risks have been relatively undertheorized despite their importance. Despite 
their importance, there is very limited, if any, economic analysis of systemic cyber risks. To 
highlight the critical importance of systemic cyber risks, let us consider how financial transactions 
are performed in digital systems. Financial systemic risks conversely, have been significantly 
theorized and researched. A significant systemic cyber disruption of digital financial systems could 
have the effects of a major financial crisis. In addition, a systemic cyber adverse event could have 
existential consequences. There could be systemic cyberattacks on military installations, 
detonating nuclear weapons that would escalate conflict and initiate war. Systemic cyber events 
can constitute casus belli, due to their substantial impact. ‘Insurance against war by preparation 
for it is, of all methods, the most business-like’ (Luce, 1891). Understanding, analyzing and 
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researching systemic cyber risks and systemically defending against them can be the best way to 
prevent costly outcomes, conflict and ultimately the possibility of war. 
Therefore, our purpose is to better understand systemic cyber risks. This paper attempts to 
address some conceptual flaws of cyberspace regarding the critical role of systemic cyber risks. It 
focuses on the impact and in particular the valuation of the effects of potential systemic cyber risks. 
Valuation is an essential and established element in theorizing the aspects of economics and 
constructing a broader framework for the assessment of risks. This paper briefly draws analogies 
from the financial sector and crises and applies them to cyber risk. It also discusses the limitations 
to valuation methodology that externalities, property rights and liability can bring. To make the 
analysis more applicable, we examine the value of IP cyber theft, innovation models and how 
systemic cyber risks can affect the persistence of innovation and its dominance. Finally, we discuss 
the strategic implications of systemic cyber risks for the private sector, the military, national power 
and alliances.  
Systemic Cyber Risks and Financial Analogies 
”Systemic cyber risk is the risk that a cyber event (attack(s) or other adverse event(s)) at an 
individual component of a critical infrastructure ecosystem will cause significant delay, denial, 
breakdown, disruption or loss, such that services are impacted not only in the originating 
component but consequences also cascade into related (logically and/or geographically) ecosystem 
components, resulting in significant adverse effects to public health or safety, economic security 
or national security.” (WEF, 2016)  
In general, there does not seem to be a consensus on a common definition of systemic cyber 
risks. Sommer and Brown (2011) find that the definition varies between the two extremes of 
occasions of multiple attacks on insignificant computer systems, and rather rare events that have 
been subject to criminal convictions.  
Furthermore, there are other and major limitations to the set of existing definitions. Firstly, 
it is necessary to define the limits of a system. Is the focus global or regional and national? Is one 
referring to the whole of cyberspace or national cyber systems or Critical Information 
Infrastructures (CII)? Therefore, the definition of the system upon which the concept of systemic 
cyber risk is based is crucial. Usually the term ‘systemic’ refers to large scale, catastrophic events. 
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Systemic cyber risks that could have an overall catastrophic outcome should therefore be 
characterized using a definable whole system approach combined with calculable aggregations of 
risks.  
Systemic cyber risks feature some characteristics that can assist in better defining and 
understanding them. (Mallery and Petratos, 2018). Cascading is a fundamental characteristic. 
However, it is essential to not only assume cascade but also to analyze its effects. What initiates a 
cascade and the transmission and amplification channels and mechanisms? It could be said that 
cascades propagate due to complex and critical interdependencies. The system architecture and 
the structure and nature of interdependencies among cyber assets define how cascades evolve and 
impact systems. Interdependencies highlight the massive complexity of modern cyber systems.  
(Mallery and Petratos, 2018). As the number of connected devices and related applications grows 
exponentially, complexity and interdependencies increase respectively. Another characteristic 
strongly related to complexity is the high degree of uncertainty. The compellingly dynamic 
character of the internet contributes to the uncertainty (Mallery and Petratos, 2018). The number 
of interconnected devices, applications and technological innovations rapidly change cyberspace 
and increase the uncertainty. Within this changing ecosystem it is difficult to observe the factors 
that can trigger a systemic failure and its transmission and amplification mechanisms. (Pederson 
et al . 2006)   
An additional methodological difficulty directly related to uncertainty is that there is hardly 
any historical systemic cyber precedence and data. It is unlikely that there have been yet any 
systemic cyber adverse events with cataclysmic dimensions.  However, there have been 
cyberattacks with systemic characteristics, that have cost millions and in some cases billions of 
dollars, As the sophistication of cyberattackers increase, it is likely to have more systemic cyber 
events. It remains subjective and debatable which events can be classified as cyber systemic. 
Nevertheless, a helpful method is to use relevant historical, economic, and other useful metaphors 
to enrich the discourse and provide insight into cyber strategy and policy (Goldberg and Arquilla, 
2014). The analogies with financial and economic literature are valuable for three main reasons. 
Firstly, the financial and economic literature on systemic financial risks and crises has been 
significantly developed, particularly after the latest financial crises and bears parallelisms to 
cyberspace (Petratos, 2018). Secondly, the methodology of analogies between financial and cyber 
has been successfully used before and applied to the sub-prime crisis and the Lehman Brothers 
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event (Zurich, 2014). Finally, it shares similar systemic characteristics and evaluates the outcomes 
of adverse systemic events.  
Impact Valuation, Externalities, Property Rights and Liability  
 It is crucial to be able to value the economic impact of cyberattacks and especially evaluate 
the value at risk from systemic cyber risks because this is an illustrative way to display the damage 
that cyberattacks can cause Simple cyberattacks do not have significant impact and it is relatively 
easy to value them. However, it is hard to provide an accurate valuation of large scale and systemic 
cyber risks. This is due to the characteristics of systemic cyber risks. The complexity of IT systems 
and operations, the complex and critical interdependencies involved in the propagation of 
cyberattacks, and the high level of uncertainty all limit successful valuation. The lack of sufficient 
historical data regarding systemic cyber risks is probably the biggest problem. Although there are 
some related data points, forecasting the level of potential damage is difficult and ambiguous.   
In addition to the characteristics of systemic cyber risks, there are numerous externalities 
that make it even harder to value their potential impact. An IMF paper argues that ‘Cyber risk is a 
textbook example of a systemic risk’ (Kopp et al. 2017). Indeed, many characteristics of systemic 
risks are analogous to cyber risks, especially large scale cyber risks. These market failures include 
information asymmetries, strategic complementarities, coordination failure, and externalities as 
well as economies of scale, barriers to entry, and concentration of risk (Kopp et al. 2017). This is 
a wide range of market failures. Even more externalities, such as herding, contractual and other 
types of network externalities can be added to the list of systemic cyber risks. (Mallery and 
Petratos, 2018; Petratos).  
An enormous drawback to evaluating the value at risk from systemic cyber threats is that 
property rights in cyberspace are not well defined. The ownership of information and the 
infrastructure in which it is transmitted is often unclear. Anonymity remains an unresolved issue. 
It is hard to identify the owners and distributors of information. The case of Facebook and 
Cambridge Analytica illustrate this problem. Identity and attribution cannot be effective without 
well-defined property rights. Furthermore, the problems continue with responsibility and liability. 
It is not possible to construct a theory of liability in cyberspace without property rights. 
Accordingly, legal implementation and criminal conviction are ineffective, as are remedies and 
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compensation. Finally, without well defined property rights, it is difficult to correct externalities 
(Coase, 1960).  
More attention should be paid to improving the definition of property rights in cyberspace. 
It is fundamental to the better valuation and assessment of risks. Without valuation one cannot 
effectively prioritize and invest in systemic defense, share risks, create alliances, and in general 
guide cyber defense policies according to the significance of the risk. “In contrast to many other 
financial and operational risks, loss data on cyber events is either not available or not useable for 
pricing cyber risk.” (Kopp et al. 2017). The availability of data and disclosure of cyberattack 
information is not the only impediment, the methods and tools used to value (price) cyber risk also 
pose a problem. However, financial analogies and their application to cyberspace can prove very 
useful for generating systemic cyber scenarios. Systemic cyber scenarios are necessary to 
understand the nature and level of threats and associated risks.  
IP Cyber Theft and Innovation Dominance  
Our discussion so far has been theoretical. It would be useful to underline it with a practical 
example of systemic cyber risks and valuation by addressing innovation models commonly 
discussed in financial analogies. A example  that can be considered to share characteristics with 
systemic cyber risks is Intellectual Property (IP) theft.  Cyber IP theft incidents usually denote 
large scale operations and impact.  It is also a persistent threat. Some figures indicate that IP theft 
can reach $ 600 billion per year3. However, this might be an underestimation or overestimation of 
the real figure. There is a need for better valuation models and methods (i.e. Work Factor Analysis, 
Mallery, 2016) to provide more accurate calculations. 
There are numerous innovation models that can be challenged by cyber IP theft (i.e. 
production at lower cost, quicker release of products etc.). However, we would like to focus on 
radical and disruptive innovations. Both radical and disruptive innovations are on the cutting edge 
of innovation. They are not concerned with imitative innovation activities, which generates much 
                                                 
3 The range of estimates was from $ 255 billion to $ 600 billion annually. ‘Further, while cyber espionage may have 
decreased from some actors, several sources report that the worst and most capable actors still persist in hacking for 
economic gain’. In The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property by The National Bureau of 
Asian Research (2017). Update to the IP Commission. The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessment 
of the Challenges and US Policy. The National Bureau of Asian Research.  
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lower value. In that sense disruptive and radical innovation can be deemed responsible for 
producing companies with extraordinary value (i.e. Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook, etc.). Moreover, 
these innovations can create new markets, disrupt, completely change and eventually make 
existing markets irrelevant4.5 In that sense, cyber IP theft that targets disruptive and radical 
innovations can be a ‘game changer’ in many fields. Cyber theft of high value innovations can 
undermine the competitive and strategic advantage of nations and change the balance of power.  
Such innovations can, not only, affect markets, whole industries, national industrial 
structure and innovation policy, but they can also have remarkably systemic strategic and defense 
implications. A notable example is stealth technology and its implications for the Research and 
Development (R&D) process behind defense acquisitions and strategies found in modern nations. 
In order to develop stealth technology and the fifth generation of combat aircraft (i.e. F-35), there 
is a need for significant investment. The F-35 multirole aircraft can be considered a disruptive 
innovation, since it can render the earliest fourth generation fighters obsolete. The value of stealth 
technology, and in particular the F-35, is hard to estimate. It is not only the investment in this  
technology that defines its valuation, but a broader array of value elements, ranging from 
intangible assets (i.e. related IP and diffusion of technology) to the strategic value of having unique 
weaponry in strategies of deterrence, containment and air superiority. There are significant 
indications that such technology has been obtained by other nations using cyber espionage 
operations6. Similar cases can be true for naval and ground forces military innovations and 
technologies.  
In that sense, cyber IP theft does not only have severe economic implications for wealth 
and employment, it can also have severe effects on the systemic innovation of states. It can 
furthermore have security consequences that can threaten U.S. military supremacy and superiority 
on multiple levels. Cyber activities and more specifically systemic cyber IP theft can challenge 
military and national power dominance, specifically of the United States (Nye, 2010). Iit is 
                                                 
4 For a description of Disruptive Innovations see for example, Christensen et al., (2015).  
5 For a description of Radical Innovations see for example, Tellis et al., (2009).  
6 Jeff Daniels, ‘’Chinese theft of sensitive US military technology is still a 'huge problem,' says defense analyst’’ 
CNBC, Nov 8, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/08/chinese-theft-of-sensitive-us-military-technology-still-
huge-problem.html 
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essential to design appropriate cybersecurity policies.  To do the latter, it is necessary improve 
valuation methods for systemic and in general cyber security risks.  
Conclusions and Strategic Implications  
Cyber risks have numerous strategic implications. Systemic cyber risks, and especially the 
example of systemic cyber IP theft, by definition, can have massive economic, technology and 
innovation implications and bring changes to markets, industries, society and national power.  We 
have already discussed the economic implications and innovation dominance. A useful parallelism 
lies between systemic cyber risks and the systemic theories and levels of analysis in international 
relations. The value at risk and the potential impact of systemic cyber risks can significantly affect 
the broader basic concepts in international relations. State sovereignty can be noticeably breached 
by systemic cyberattacks.  
National power, soft and hard, can be also significantly affected. This is particularly true 
for smaller states, where systemic cyber events could substantially degrade their capabilities and 
consequently increase the level of threats. In the long term, cyber IP theft and other potential 
systemic cyber risks can change the balance of power between states. States can close economic 
and defense capability gaps and sometimes leapfrog. Therefore, in a complex world, and possibly 
related to other adverse events, cyber systemic risks could trigger frictions, cause conflict 
escalation and in some cases might constitute casus belli. Finally, it raises concerns about alliances 
and what a systemic cyberattack in a member state might mean and what reactions it would cause.  
Systemic cyber risks require systemic responses and therefore a whole system approach. 
The first step is to define them and better understand their characteristics and the value of their 
potential impact. The estimation of the value at risk is crucial for appropriate prioritization, 
investment and cooperation. Cooperation and the formation of alliances are usually based on 
desired outcomes and thus the valuation of these outcomes is essential. Externalities can cause 
significant limitations and property rights could assist in correcting them and improving liability 
and legal implementation. Property rights are necessary for tackling cyber IP theft and most 
importantly for defining legal actions, remedies and compensation that can prevent it. At the same 
time, property rights are crucial for outlining national sovereignty. Norms can facilitate property 
rights and assist in the avoidance of systemic cyber risks. Norms and legal rules have a systemic 
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character (Kratochwil, 1989) and can correspond to the systemic cyber risks challenges. Norms 
should apply to both economic issues as well as national security dimensions.  
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